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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
statement tends to prove another fact in addition to the defendant's predis-
position.13s Juries in the Fourth Circuit thus cannot assess the memory,
perception, or sincerity of witnesses whose testimony is crucial to the central
issue of predisposition in entrapment cases. 136
SARAH DOUGLAS PUGH
VIII. PRsoNERs' RIGHTS
Schrader v. White: Fourth Circuit Rejects Totality Analysis
for Cruel and Unusual Conditions of Confinement
The eighth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment upon prisoners confined within
state and federal prisons.I In Rhodes v. Chapman2 the United States Supreme
135. See Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1083-84 (in some circumstances, confrontation clause does not
apply to hearsay that proves Government's reason for investigating as well as predisposition).
136. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (concerning value of witness' testimony at
trial); supra note 83 (predisposition central to entrapment defense).
1. U.S. COST. amend. VIII. The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
The drafters of the eighth amendment, men familiar with the practices of burning at the stake,
disembowelment, quartering, breaking on the wheel, and the use of the rack and thumbscrew
as punishment, sought to eliminate these practices through a prohibition of "cruel and unusual"
punishment. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (punishments that involve torture or
lingering death are cruel). The meaning of the phrase "cruel and unusual" must constantly
adapt to prevailing standards of decency and humanitarianism, standards that constantly change
as society evolves toward a more civilized state. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(punishment of expatriation held more primitive than torture). Although courts focus upon the
cruelty rather than the unusual nature of a punishment, some confusion exists over whether a
distinction should be drawn between the words cruel and unusual. See Trop, 356 U.S. 86, 100
n.32 (1957) (Court's refusal to distinguish between words cruel and unusual); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 379 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (word unusual neither limits nor expands eighth
amendment's ban on cruel punishments). But see Furman, 408 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (word unusual may have distinct meaning); Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (infrequent imposition of death penalty may be unconstitutionally unusual). See
generally Grannucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted". The Original Meaning,
57 CALiF. L. REv. 839 (1969) (historical study of phrase "cruel and unusual").
The eighth amendment is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (Court applies
eighth'amendment to states by using fourteenth amendment); U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV (mandates
that no state shall deny any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the eighth amendment protects prisoners from
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Court held that the cruel and unusual punishment clause is applicable to
conditions of confinement.' The Rhodes conditions of confinement standard
mandates that prison conditions which involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain, or which constitute a deprivation of basic human needs,
or which are excessive in relation to the crime committed, violate the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.4 The Rhodes
cruel and unusual punishment in three areas. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-65
(1977). In Ingraham v. Wright, the United States Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment
acts as a check on types of punishment which courts may impose, limits the activities which
courts may proscribe as criminal and prohibits any punishment which is excessive in relation to
the crime committed. Id.; see also Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir. 1984) (eighth
amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment inflicted through brutality
of prison official), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1413 (1985); Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667 (holding
unconstitutional a California statute that made addiction to drugs a criminal offense); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (punishment of hard labor and chains for 12 years
for crime of falsifying records constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
In the past, federal courts practiced a "hands-off" policy in regard to addressing
prisoners' claims of cruel and unusual conditions of confinement. See Note, Beyond the Ken
of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE
L.J. 506, 516-26 (1969) (discussion of "hands-off" policy). The "hands-off" policy reflected.
the idea that matters relating to prison conditions of confinement are not within the jurisdiction
of the courts. Id. at 526. Today courts take an active role in evaluating particular punishments
and prison conditions in light of the eighth afnendment. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.
337, 352 (1981) (courts have duty to address prisoners' claims of cruel and unusual conditions
of confinement); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 473 (8th Cir. 1984) (dicta) (courts are only
source of protection for prisoners' rights); see also infra note 8 (listing cases in which courts
have addressed eighth amendment challenges to prison conditions). The great amount of filed
complaints challenging conditions of confinement illustrate the need for judicial scrutiny of
prison conditions. See 3 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 34
(1980) (8000 complaints filed by inmates challenging prison conditions of confinement during
1980).
2. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
3. See Rhodes V. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 337 (Court states that eighth amendment is
applicable to conditions of confinement). In Rhodes v. Chapman, prisoners at the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) challenged the prison's practice of double celling as violative
of the eighth amendment. Id. at 340. Double celling refers to the practice of housing two
prisoners in one cell. Id. at 339-40; see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 344-45 (identifying Rhodes as
first eighth amendment challenge to conditions of confinement that United States Supreme
Court has addressed). But see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 368 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting
that the Supreme Court first addressed issue of whether prison conditions could constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in Hutto v. Finney); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685-88 (1978).
In Hutto v. Finney, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a district court's order
that prohibited Arkansas prisons from placing a prisoner in punitive isolation for longer than
thirty days. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978). The repeated failure of the Arkansas
prisons to remedy judicially determined eighth amendment violations such as punitive isolation
practices compelled the district court to order specific remedies. Id. at 687. The Supreme Court
in Hutto noted that many factors, including the length of time prisoners spent in isolation,
contributed to the unconstitutionality of the punitive isolation practice carried out within
Arkansas' prisons. Id. The Court, therefore, upheld the district court's order, that directed
remedies for each factor that contributed to the unconstitutionality of punitive isolation within
the Arkansas prison system. Id.
4. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382
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decision's analysis examined the cumulative effect of factors related to double
ceiling-a condition of confinement-to determine whether that prison
condition violated the eighth amendment.6 The Rhodes opinion provided
both a standard and an analysis for the lower federal courts to utilize
when faced with inmates' challenges to conditions of confinement with-
in a prison.7 A division, however, exists among the federal courts con-
cerning the proper application of the Rhodes analysis to cases involving
more than one particular challenged condition of.confinement.8 Some federal
courts examine the totality of the challenged prison conditions to determine
whether the cumulative effect of the prison conditions amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment. 9 Other federal courts review each individual challenged
prison condition in an isolated fashion to determine whether the individual
condition of confinement amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 0 In
(1910) (punishment of 12 years of hard labor in chains for crime of falsifying records is
excessive punishment in violation of eighth amendment); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681-
83 (1978) (sanitation, food, personal safety, and clothing are examples of basic human needs).
5. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (definition of double ceiling and brief factual
summary of Rhodes).
6. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-49. To determine whether double ceiling violated the eighth
amendment, the Supreme Court in Rhodes examined the duration of prisoners' sentences, the
overpopulation within the prison, the amount of space inmates were required to share, the
percent of time inmates spent in prison cells, and the length of time the prison administration
planned to practice double celing. Id.
7. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-49 (Rhodes standard and analysis); see also supra text
accompanying notes 4 & 6 (same).
8. Compare Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 999 (3d Cir. 1983)
(requires finding of specific, individual eighth amendment violations, rejects totality analysis),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984); Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1982) (rejects
totality of conditions analysis), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d
1237, 1246-47 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying individual condition analysis and rejecting idea that
totality of otherwise constitutional conditions of confinement may become unconstitutional through
aggregation); with Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (separate
statement) (totality of conditions analysis applicable to litigation involving challenges to condi-
tions of confinement); Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Bienvenu v.
Beauregard Parish Police Jury, 705 F.2d 1457, 1460 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Stewart v. Winter,
669 F.2d 328, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1982) (same); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 428 (4th Cir. 1981)
(same); Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Laaman v. Helgemoe,
437 F. Supp. 269, 317 (D.N.H. 1977) (same).
9. See Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 335-36 (5th Cir. 1982) (explanation of totality
of conditions analysis). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Stewart v.
Winter demonstrated that courts that examine prison conditions under the totality of conditions
analysis review the cumulative impact of all the conditions of confinement within a prison as
well as the factors that have created the conditions to determine whether the totality of
conditions violates the eighth amendment. Id. at 336; see also supra note 8 (listing other courts
that employ totality of conditions analysis).
10. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1982) (explanation of individual
condition analysis). Courts which examine prison conditions under the individual condition
analysis recognize that many factors contribute to a particular prison condition. Id. These
courts, however, review each prison condition in isolation to determine whether the specific
condition itself amounts to an eighth amendment violation. Id. at 1247; see also supra note 8 (listing
other courts that employ an individual condition analysis).
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Shrader v. White, " the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recently applied the Rhodes standard to determine whether several different
conditions of confinement at the Virginia State Penitentiary (VSP) amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment.1
2
In Shrader, inmates at the VSP brought a class action in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia challenging condi-
tions of confinement at the VSP.1a The VSP inmates claimed that factors
including the frequency of attacks at the VSP, the inadequacy of the VSP
security and the prevalence of illegal drugs and weapons among the VSP
prison population combined to create a severe threat to inmate safety.' 4 The
VSP inmates further alleged that threats to inmate safety, inadequate
physical facilities, 5 fire hazards,' 6 and inadequate food' 7 at the VSP violated
11. 761 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1985).
12. See Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d at 977-80 (discussing applicability of Rhodes eighth
amendment standard to Shrader). In Shrader, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit applied the Rhodes standard through the unprecedented use of a specific factor analysis.
Id. at 977-987; see infra notes 137-144 and accompanying text (demonstrating dissimilarity be-
tween Shrader court's specific factor analysis and other analyses). The specific factor analysis
examines whether each specific factor involved in a particular prison condition amounts individually
to an eighth amendment violation. Id.
13. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 977. In Shrader, the inmates brought a eighth amendment
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 mandates that
any person acting under color of state law who deprives a person of constitutionally guaranteed
civil rights shall be liable to the deprived person. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Federal courts have
original jurisdiction over section 1983 claims under Article III, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, which declares in part that the judicial power of the federal courts shall extend
to all cases arising under the laws of the United States. U.S.CoNsT. art. III, § 2. State courts
may also entertain § 1983 claims. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7, reh'g denied,
445 U.S. 920 (1980). In cases involving prisoners' claims that state officials caused the prisoners
to suffer deprivation of the eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual conditions
of confinement, the alleged deprivation must be the result of either the prison official's
intentional or reckless disregard of the prisoner's rights. See Branchcomb v. Brewer, 669 F.2d
1297, 1298 (8th Cir. 1982) (must show intentional and reckless disregard of prisoners' rights to
establish an eighth amendment violation); see also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)
(claimant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show that defendant committed conduct under color of
state law and thus deprived plaintiff of constitutional or lawful right, privilege or immunity);
Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (person's eighth amendment right to
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment still protected when person incarcerated) appeal
after remand, 690 F.2d 742 (1979). See generally Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of
Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HAgv. L. Rav. 610, 610-657 (1979).
14. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 980.
15. See id. at 983-84. In Shrader, the VSP inmates complained specifically of a leaky
prison roof that caused water damage, nesting of pigeons in the roof, shower malfunctions,
and inadequate lighting. Id.
16. See id. at 984-86. The VSP inmates in Shrader argued that the prison presented a fire
threat to the inmates because the architecture of the VSP did not allow smoke and fumes to
escape from the prison. Id. at 985.
17. See id. at 986. In Shrader, the VSP inmates claimed that unsanitary prison conditions
resulted in inadequate, unsanitary food. Id.
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the eighth amendment." At the district court, the plaintiffs and defendants
consented to a trial before a United States District Court magistrate.' 9
In addressing the issue of inmate safety, the district court magistrate
applied a standard that required the VSP prisoners to demonstrate that the VSP
inmate population experienced mental pain resulting from fear of attack to
support a claim of cruel and unusual prison conditions. 20 In addition, the
magistrate's standard mandated that the VSP prisoners demonstrate prison
officials' reckless and wanton infliction of mental pain in order to establish
an eighth amendment violation. " Furthermore, the district court magistrate
required the VSP inmates to establish that the pain prisoners experienced served
no penological purpose. 22 Finally, the district court magistrate suggested that
an examination of the inmate population's actual fear of harm might indicate
whether the risk of violence at the VSP amounted to an eighth amendment
violation.
3
In applying the reckless and wanton infliction of pain standard, the
district court magistrate did not examine the overall threat presented to
inmate safety at the VSP.24 Instead, the magistrate applied the standard to
each individual factor that contributed to the threat to inmate safety. 2s The
district court magistrate first addressed the inmates' complaint of frequent
attacks among prisoners at the VSP.26 The magistrate, considering conflicting
evidence, found that the amount of attacks at the VSP did not cause any
18. Id. at 977.
19. See id. at 977; see also FED. R: Cirv. P. 73(a). Rule 73(a) permits a specially designated
magistrate to preside over a case normally brought in a district court as long as the parties
involved consent to the magistrate's jurisdiction. FED. R. Cirv. P. 73(a). Section 636(c) of Title
28 of the United States Code provides the authority for the magistrate's permissible jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1982). Parties may appeal a magistrate's decision in the circuit court of
appeals for the magistrate's district unless the parties have agreed to follow the optional appeal
route provided in Section 636(d). 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1982). The optional appeal rule provides
that, at the time of reference to a magistrate, the parties may consent to an appeal on the
record to a district court judge. FED. R. Crv. P. 73(d).
20. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 978-79. The magistrate in Shrader held that a showing of
serious mental and emotional deterioration will establish the existence of pain necessary to
constitute an eighth amendment violation. Id. at 979.
21. See id. at 979 (discussing magistrate's standard).
22. See id. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976) (joint option). In Gregg v.
Georgia, the United States Supreme Court noted that the penological purpose of a punishment
refers to goals of criminal justice that the particular punishment intends to further. Id.; see also
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) (deterrence, rehabilitation and internal prison
security are legitimate penological goals). See generally S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTION 736-37 (2d ed. 1973) (justifiable goals of punishment include retribution, deterrence,
and rehabilitation).
23. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 978-79 (discussion of magistrate's standard).
24. See infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text (explaining magistrate's application of
standard to specific factors involved in prison conditions).
25. Id.
26. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 987 (discussing magistrate's analysis); supra note 14 and
accompanying text (VSP inmates complain that frequent attacks contribute to prison condition
of threat to inmate safety).
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real fear among the prison population and, thus, did not present harm
of constitutional magnitude. 27 In addition, the magistrate determined that
the only prisoners harmed by prison violence were those prisoners who
instigated fights orwere involved in illicit activities. 2 The magistrate, there-
fore, concluded that the frequency of attacks at the VSP did not amount to
an unconstitutional risk of harm.
29
The magistrate next considered the VSP inmates' complaint of inadequate
security.30 Noting that the VSP's three to one inmate-to-guard ratio compared
favorably to the national average inmate-to-guard ratio of five to one, that
the VSP prison officials separated potentially hostile inmates, and that the
VSP prison officials administered routine cell and inmate searches, the
magistrate found that security conditions at the VSP did not violate the
eighth amendment. 3
The magistrate then reviewed the prisoners' complaints of widespread il-
legal drug abuse and trafficking at the VSP.3 2 Despite the magistrate's earlier
determination that only prisoners who engaged in illicit activities were in danger
of violent attacks, the magistrate found no evidence that illicit drug use led
to increased violence. 3 Consequently, the magistrate held that drug availability
27. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 981 (discussing magistrate's findings). The evidence presented
in Shrader conflicted on every issue. Id. at 980. The conflicting evidence required the magistrate
to make specific credibility determinations. Id. The Shrader magistrate's conclusion that the
VSP prisoners did not experience fear from the frequency of attacks rested upon the testimonies
of those prison administrators and inmates whom the magistrate determined were credible
witnesses. Id. at 981. The magistrate chose to ignore other witnesses testimonies that attested
to the need for self-protection practices such as weapon carrying and self-imposed isolation
which prisoners practiced to avoid harm. See id. at 993-94 (Sprouse, J., concurring and
dissenting) (dissent's consideration of inmates' testimonies concerning fear).
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure suggests that an appellate court may
reverse a district court magistrate's findings of fact when the findings of fact are clearly
erroneous. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is
firmly convinced that, although some evidence supports the magistrate's decision, the magis-
trate's decision is incorrect. Id. But cf. Olgin v. Darnell, 664 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1981)
(appellate court cannot reappraise the credibility of witnesses); Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petro-
leum Corp., 556 F.2d 702, 703 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (appellate
court must respect district court's credibility findings); 9 WIGr & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2586 at 736-37 (1971) (appellate court must respect district court factfinder's
credibility determinations).
28. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 981 (discussing magistrate's analysis).
29. See id. (discussing magistrate's conclusion)
30. See id. (discussing magistrate's analysis); note 14 and accompanying text (VSP
inmates complained that inadequate security contributed to prison condition of threat to inmate
safety).
31. See id. at 994 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting). In Shrader, the magistrate
examined only whether preventative practices existed and did not examine the effectiveness of
the preventative practices. Id. at 995-96. But cf. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1249-50
(court still might find deliberate indifference towards threat of harm despite prison officials'
attempt to remedy harm).
32. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 981 (discussing magistrate's findings).
33. See id. at 992 (Sprouse, J., dissenting and concurring) (Sharder dissent examines
magistrate's contradictory findings of fact).
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and trafficking at the VSP did not endanger the VSP prisoners and, therefore,
did not violate the eighth amendment."'
Finally, the district court magistrate addressed the inmates' claim that
materials, which inmates could craft into dangerous weapons, were left
unprotected and were easily accessible to the prison population.3 5 Although
the magistrate found that the evidence supported the inmates' claim, 3 6 the
magistrate held that the eighth amendment protects prisoners from the act
of assault rather than from the existence of dangerous weapons,3 7 Conse-
quently, the district court magistrate dismissed the inmates' complaint that
the availability of weapons constituted an eighth amendment violation.38
Subsequently, the magistrate also dismissed the fire hazard, physical plant,
and food quality issues on the ground that those individual prison conditions
did not violate the eighth amendment.
39
The VSP inmates appealed the magistrate's dismissal of the Shrader suit
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.4 First, the
inmates contended that the district court magistrate applied an incorrect legal
standard to the inmates' claim for relief from the threat of violent attacks
by other inmates at the VSP. 41 The prisoners argued that the magistrate's
standard failed to consider the Fourth Circuit's holdings in Woodhous v.
Virginia42 and Withers v. Levine.43 Woodhous and Withers effectively held
34. See id. (discussing magistrate's findings).
35. See id. at 982-83 (discussing magistrate's analysis). In Shrader, the inmates provided
evidence concerning the weapons that prisoners used in carrying out inmate upon inmate
assaults. Id. at 990 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting). Knives and daggers manufactured
in the prison chair factory from pieces of scrap metal stolen from the metal shop were the most
widely used weapons at the VSP. Id. at 991. The prison-made knives were generally 10 to 12
inches in length and were manufactured at the rate of 30 knives per week. Id. at 991.
Prisoners at the VSP also employed horseshoe pegs, ice picks, pipe, scalding water, and acid
as weapons. Id. at 990-91.
36. See supra text accompanying note 14 (inmates claimed that weapons were prevalent
throughout prison).
37. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 982 (discussing magistrate's explanation that weapons are
not dangerous in themselves).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 983-86.
40. Id. at 977; see supra note 19 (examining inmates' ability to appeal to circuit court of
appeals); infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing grounds for inmates' appeal).
41. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 977; see infra notes 42-45 (explaining inmates' complaint that
magistrate used wrong standard of review for determining presence of eighth amendment
violation).
42. 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973). In Woodhous v. Virginia, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that relief is appropriate for a prisoner who establishes the
existence of a pervasive risk of harm from fellow prisoners and negligence on the part of a
prison official in protecting prisoners from violence or threats of violence. Id. at 890.
43. 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980). In Withers v. Levine,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that evidence that the frequency
of assaults within a prison puts prisoners in reasonable fear for their safety and reasonably
alerts prison officials of the need for security precautions establishes a pervasive risk of harm.
Id. at 161.
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that to establish an eighth amendment violation a prisoner must prove that
a prison official negligently disregarded a pervasive risk of harm which
resulted in the prisoner's reasonable fear of violence." The inmates challenged
the district court magistrate's determination that the Rhodes opinion modi-
fied the Woodhous- Withers eighth amendment standard to require evidence
of a prison official's unnecessary and wanton activity which resulted in actual
pain to prisoners. 45 Second, the VSP prisoners contended that the district
court magistrate made clearly erroneous findings of fact in regard to the
challenged prison conditions of inadequate safety, inadequate physical facil-
ities, inadequate food and fire hazards allegedly violative of the eighth amend-
ment. 6 On appeal, the prisoners argued primarily that the threat of harm
to the inmates which resulted from the combination of frequent inmate at-
tacks at the VSP, the inadequate security manpower at the VSP, and the
prevalance of drugs and weapons at the VSP, supported a finding of cruel
and unusual punishment.
47
The Fourth Circuit in Shrader commenced a review of the district court's
decision with an examination of the standard that the district court magistrate
applied to determine whether the threat of violence at the VSP constituted
an eighth amendment violation.4 ' The Shrader court upheld the magistrate's
determination that the Rhodes conditions of confinement standard would re-
quire evidence of a prison official's reckless or wanton disregard of a per-
vasive risk of harm to inmate safety to establish an eighth amendment viola-
tion. 9 Furthermore, the Shrader court recognized that the Rhodes standard
would require the VSP prisoners to demonstrate that the reckless activity of
a prison official caused severe mental pain to prisoners fearing attack." The
Fourth Circuit in Shrader, therefore, agreed with the magistrate that Rhodes
modified the Woodhouse- Withers eighth amendment standard, a standard
44. See Woodhous, 487 F.2d at 890. Woodhous required only a showing of a prison
official's lack of reasonable care toward a pervasive risk of harm to support an eighth
amendment claim. Id.; Withers, 615 F.2d at 162. The Withers court required that prisoners
establish only a reasonable fear of harm, not actual mental pain, or order to support an eighth
amendment violation. Withers, 615 F.2d at 158; also supra notes 42 and 43 (explaining
Woodhous and Withers).
45. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 977-79 (inmates argue that only negligent prison official
activity and reasonable fear among prisoners necessary for successful eighth amendment challenge
to prison conditions).
46. See id. at 977 (prisoners appealed magistrate's findings).
47. See id. at 980 (inmates argued that combination of factors endangered prisoners'
safety in violation of eighth amendment).
48. See id. at 977-80 (reviewing magistrate's standard).
49. Id. at 979-80. The Shrader court rejected the VSP inmates' theory that Rhodes'
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain standard does not apply beyond the specific facts of
Rhodes. Id. at 980. Instead, the Shrader court found that Rhodes' unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain standard applied to all prisoners' claims of cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
at 980.
50. See id. at 978-79 (suggesting that presence of fear among prisoners indicates magnitude
of threat to inmate safety).
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which had originally required merely a showing that a prisoner's reasonable
fear of harm resulted from a prison official's negligent behavior.51 The Shrader
court upheld the magistrate's determination that a showing of a prison of-
ficial's reckless behavior and of prison inmates' suffering of mental pain are
crucial to the success of an eighth amendment claim under the modified
Woodhouse-Withers standard.5 2 The Shrader court, therefore, rejected the in-
mates' claim that the magistrate had applied an erroneous legal standard in
considering the prisoners' claim of constitutionally inadequate inmate safety."
The Fourth Circuit in Shrader next addressed the inmates' second ground
for appeal-that the district court magistrate made clearly erroneous findings
of fact concerning conditions of confinement at the VSP. 54 The Shrader
court, like the district court magistrate, analyzed each specific factor that
allegedly had threatened inmate safety to determine whether each particular
factor, considered alone, amounted to a pervasive risk of harm.5 5 Although
the Shrader court applied a specific factor analysis, the Shrader court
awarded great deference to the district court's findings of fact concerning issues
on which evidence conflicted." For example, the Shrader court considered the
prisoners' claim that the frequency of attacks at the VSP contributed to a
threat to inmate safety in violation of the eighth amendment.5 7 The Shrader
51. See id. at 978-80; see also supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (explaining
difference in evidence necessary to satisfy the Rhodes and Withers-Woodhous eighth amendment
standards).
52. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 977-80. The Shrader court agreed with the district court magistrate
that the Supreme Court's decision in Rhodes must take precedence over the federal court's
Withers- Woodhous standard. Id. Consequently, the Shrader court noted that after Rhodes,
prisoners who claim cruel and unusual threats to inmate safety must allege that a prison official's
reckless activity resulted in a pervasive risk of harm to prisoners and caused the prisoners
significant mental pain due to fear of attack. Id.
53. Id. at 980.
54. Id. at 980-87.
55. Id. at 980-83; see also infra notes 56-74 and accompanying text (demonstrating Shrader
court's specific factor analysis).
56. See supra note 27 (discussing appellate court function in review of district court's
credibility determinations). The Shrader majority stressed that the court's application of the
clearly erroneous standard must accord great deference to the magistrate's credibility determi-
nations of all the evidence presented. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 980. The Shrader dissent argued
that, while the court should accord the magistrate's specific credibility determinations wide
latitude, the magistrate's general credibility findings, made when evidence conflicted, should be
subject completely to the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. at 987 (Sprouse, J., concurring
and dissenting). In Philipps v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a district court's findings based upon credibility
determinations will stand unless the reviewing court determines that the district court's findings
are clearly erroneous. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 556 F.2d 702, 703 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). The Fourth Circuit's holding in Phillips, therefore,
supports the Shrader dissent's argument that a magistrate's findings of fact are not insulated
from a clearly erroneous standard of review merely because the findings rested upon credibility
determinations. Id.
57. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 981. In Shrader, the inmates presented statistical evidence
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court's specific factor analysis, however, limited the issue to whether the
frequency of attacks alone amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.5"
Due to conflicting evidence, the Shrader court relied upon the magistrate's
finding that the prisoners did not fear attacks from other prisoners. 9 The
Shrader court reasoned that prisoners who did not experience fear could not
experience pain from fear.60 Thus, the Shrader court held that the VSP
prisoners failed to demonstrate the pain requirement of the Rhodes stand-
ard.61 The Shrader court, therefore, relied on the magistrate's factual findings
to affirm the magistrate's conclusion that the frequency of attacks at the
VSP did not amount to a constitutional violation.
62
The Shrader court subsequently considered the magistrate's decision that
the security at the VSP did not amount to a consitutional violation. 6 Evidence
that the VSP's inmate-to-guard ratio of three to one compared favorably to the
national average inmate-to-guard ratio of five to one convinced the Shrader
court that the magistrate committed no error in concluding that, as a specific
factor, the security staffing at the VSP did not present a pervasive risk of
harm.64 The Shrader court also relied on the validity of the magistrate's find-
ings concerning the problem of illegal drug use at the VSP. 61 The magistrate
found that only a small percentage of the inmate population used drugs and
that the VSP prison officials had taken steps to reduce the availability of
drugs.6' The magistrate, therefore, concluded that illegal drug use at the
of 7 inmate murders, 54 prisoner stabbings, and 24 prisoner upon prisoner assaults that occurred
during the five years prior to trial. Id. at 988 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting).
58. See id. at 981 (examining whether frequency of attacks alone causes significant fear
to prisoners).
59. Id. The district court magistrate in Shrader chose to rely on the testimony of some of the
VSP inmates who claimed no fear of assault. Id. The magistrate thus rejected testimonial
evidence that prisoners actually feared violence and employed self-defense measures including
carrying knives, carrying martial arts weapons, avoiding social activities and locking themselves
in prison cells. Id. at 993-94 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting).
60. Id. at 981.
61. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (punishment that unnecessarily and wantonly inflicts
pain amounts to cruel and unusual punishment) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)).
62. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 981.
63. Id. at 981.
64. Id. But see id. at 994 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting). The Shrader dissent
suggested that the numerical inmate-to-guard ratio at the VSP was misleading. Id. The dissent's
contention rested on evidence that the prison was severely understaffed for a facility of the
VSP's maximum security needs and that some security officials worked many hours of overtime.
Id. The dissent therefore maintained that the favorable inmate-to-guard ratio greatly overstated
the effectiveness of security manpower atthe VSP. Id.; see also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CoREcTIo s, 482-483 (1973) (recommending that
workload distribution plans for correctional officers should consider the complexity of cases,
capability of staff, and nature of case assignments in addition to numerical inmate-to-guard
ratio).
65. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 981.
66. Id.; see also note 81 and accompanying text (Shrader dissent suggests that prison
officials' preventative measures are meaningless unless effective).
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VSP did not amount to a constitutional violation.67 Complete reliance on
the magistrate's findings of fact led to the Shrader court to affirm the
magistrate's conclusion that drug activity at VSP did not amount to an
unconstitutional threat to inmate safety.
68
The last factor of the threat to inmate safety that the Shrader court
reviewed involved the magistrate's claim that the unprotected availability of
weapons and scrap metal to the prison population did not amount to a risk
of harm violative of the eighth amendment. 69 The Shrader court accepted
the magistrate's findings that weapons and scrap materials were easily
accessible to the VSP prison population. 7 The Shrader court, however, criti-
cized the magistrate's conclusion that the availability and accessibility of
weapons did not amount to a eighth amendment violation.7' Although the
magistrate stated that the VSP prisoners did not enjoy constitutional protec-
tion from the availability of weapons,72 the Shrader court held that a per-
vasive risk of harm resulting from the use of the available weapons would
demand attention from prison officials.7" The Shrader court, therefore, re-
manded the weapons issue to the district court for a determination of whether
the manufacture and distribution of weapons among the VSP inmates amounted
to a pervasive risk of harm and, if so, whether the prison officials had been
recklessly indifferent towards the pervasive risk of harm.74 The Shrader court
then upheld the magistrate's individual findings of constitutionality concern-
ing the prison conditions of fire hazards, food quality, and physical facilities
at the VSP.
7 1
The Shrader dissent concurred with the Shrader majority in finding that
the district court correctly combined the Woodhous- Withers and Rhodes
standards to create a legal standard applicable to prisoners' challenges to
violent and dangerous conditions of confinement.7 6 The dissent, however,
67. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 981 (discussing magistrate's conclusion).
68. Id. In Shrader, the Fourth Circuit relied on the magistrate's findings of fact but failed
to consider testimony from inmates that suggested a high correlation between drug activity and
violence at the VSP. Id. at 990, 992 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting).
69. Id. at 982.
70. Id.
71. See id.; supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (discussion of magistrate's reason-
ing); see also infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (Shrader court's criticism of magistrate's
reasoning and weapons issue).
72. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 982 (discussing magistrate's analysis).
73. Id. The Shrader court noted that a prison official's failure to adequately safeguard
dangerous materials and to restrict the known ability of prisoners to manufacture dangerous
materials into weapons might amount to a reckless disregard of a pervasive risk of harm. Id.
74. Id. at 983.
75. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 983-87. The Shrader court affirmed the magistrate's decision
that the VSP's physical facilities did not pose any health hazards nor did the facilities violate
societal notions of decency./Id, at 984. The Shrader court agreed also with the magistrate that
fire hazards at the VSP were' not unreasonable and that the food services provided to the inmate
population were adequate. Id. at 985-86. The Shrader court recognized that the Constitution
does not require comfortable prisons and that prisons, by their nature, will always cause some
discomfort to those incarcerated within. Id. at 987.
76. Id. at 987. See id. at 988 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the
VSP prisoners presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the majority's legal standard).
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suggested that the Shrader majority erred in isolating each factor of the
threat to inmate safety and examining whether each factor individually met the
Rhodes standard.7 7 The dissent argued that a court should examine the
cumulative effect of factors involved in a condition of confinement rather
than the specific, individual effect of a particular factor. 78 The Shrader
dissent argued that the aggregation of the factors underlying the condition
of allegedly inadequate inmate safety amounted to an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain upon the VSP prisoners and thus required a finding
of an eighth amendment violation.79
The Shrader dissent argued that the different factors constituting a threat
to inmate safety are inextricably linked and, therefore, a court should
consider the factors cumulatively.80 For example, the Shrader dissent noted
that weapon availability and inadequate security within a prison facilitate a
prisoner's ability to conduct a violent attack."' Moreover, the threat of attack
depends not only upon the lack of security practices but also depends upon
the ineffectiveness of security practices in relation to the curtailing, manu-
facture, dispensing, and use of weapons. 82 The Shrader dissent, therefore,
argued the necessity of considering the VSP prisoners' evidence cumula-
tively.83 In addition, the Shrader dissent demonstrated that the magistrate's
application of a specific factor analysis caused the magistrate to make
contradictory findings on the issue of whether illegal drug activity at the
VSP led to increased violence among prisoners at the VSP.84 The magistrate
in Shrader held that the evidence did not indicate that drug activity at the
77. Id. at 987-88 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting). The Shrader dissent's disagree-
ment with the Shrader court's analysis is most evident in the manner in which the dissent argued
that the prisoners had satisfied the Rhodes conditions of confinement standard. Id. The Shrader
dissent examined the cumulative effect of the factors contributing to the threat of violence at
the VSP. Id. In comparison to the dissent's approach, the Shrader majority considered the effect
of each individual factor affecting inmate safety in isolation. See supra notes 55-75 and accompa-
nying text (demonstrating Shrader majority's method of analysis); see also infra notes 113-18
and accompanying text (demonstrating ramifications of two different approaches).
78. See Shrader, 761 F.id at 987-88 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting
that drug activity stimulates assaults, that weapon availability increases the harm done in
assaults, and that inadequate security results in greater violence. Id. The dissent thus demon-
strated that the threat to inmate safety resulted from several factors. Id.
79. See id. The Shrader dissent contended that the prevalence of illegal drug and weapons
at the VSP, along with the inadequacy of security and frequent assaults among inmates at the
VSP, created a pervasive risk of harm that caused pain to inmates that prison officials ignored.
Id. at 987-92.
80. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (Shrader dissent's criticism of majority's
analysis).
81. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 991 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting).
82. See id. 994-95 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting) (suggesting that effectiveness
of security practices critical in determining whether security is adequate).
83. Id. at 997.
84. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text (explaining that magistrate's contradictory
holdings resulted from overly narrow examination of factors involved in the VSP inmates'
inmate safety claim).
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VSP led to high incidents of violence such as robbery or larceny. 5 In
contrast, the magistrate discounted the rate of violence at the VSP because
the only prisoners harmed by violence were inmates who engaged in the drug
trade and other illicit activities and thus had brought violence upon them-
selves. 86 The Shrader dissent, therefore, contended that the interrelationship
between factors involved in a particular condition of confinement required
a comprehensive examination of the cumulative effects of those factors to
avoid contradictory findings.
7
The Shrader court correctly applied the substantive aspects of the Rhodes
conditions of confinement test to the facts of Shrader.8 8 First, the Shrader
court recognized that Rhodes requires that prisoners must suffer pain in
order to establish an eighth amendment claim.89 Unlike the Rhodes decision,
however, which examines the particular physical effects of double celling, 90
the Shrader decision addressed the constitutionality of a dangerous prison en-
vironment. 9 While physical conditions of confinement such as double ceiling
are capable of causing physical pain, 92 confinement within an institution that
poses a great threat of physical violence presents a risk of mental and emo-
tional, rather than physical, pain.9" Consequently, the Shrader court held that
the VSP prisoners could satisfy the Rhodes pain requirement through a show-
ing of mental, rather than physical, pain.94 Although the Rhodes opinion ad-
dresses only physical pain, the Shrader opinion extends the scope of the Rhodes
85. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 992 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing
magistrate's holding).
86. See id. at 981-82 (discussing magistrate's findings of fact).
87. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text (examining Shrader dissent's position
on the interrelationship between different factors involved in the threat to inmate safety).
88. See infra notes 89-104 and accompanying text (explaining validity of Shrader court's
interpretation of Rhodes condition of confinement standard).
89. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 979; see also supra note 61 and accompanying text (Rhodes
requires unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain to prove eighth amendment violation).
90. See supra note 3 (definition of double ceiling).
91. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 980 (inmates complained that violent prison environment
threatened safety of prison population).
92. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348. The Supreme Court in Rhodes examined the constitu-
tionaity of double ceiling in light of the physical effects involved in double ceiling. Id.
Finding that no deprivation of food, medical care or adequate sanitation resulted from double
ceiling, the Court upheld the practice. Id. at 352. But see Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 368 n.17 (quoting
Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F. Supp. 802, 810-814 (D. Or. 1980)) (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting
that overcrowding may threaten mental health).
93. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 993-94 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting) (examining
testimonies of witnesses and corrections experts on the issue of mental pain from fear of
violence). The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that mental pain may amount
to an eighth amendment violation. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). In Trop, the
Supreme Court held that mental anguish caused by expatriation constitutes a punishment more
primitive than torture. Id.
94. See Shrader at 978-79 (affirming magistrate's holding that successful eighth amendment
challenge to violent prison conditions must demonstrate prisoners' mental and emotional
deterioration).
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pain requirement to include mental pain because of the different nature of
the prison condition in Shrader as compared to the condition examined in
Rhodes.9"
Secondly, the Shrader court required the VSP inmates to demonstrate
that the unnecessary or wanton activity of prison officials resulted in a
pervasive risk of harm. 96 The Rhodes decision, in holding that a prison
official's infliction of pain must be unnecessary and wanton, eliminates the
possibility that a prison official's negligent activity could provide adequate
grounds for an eighth amendment claim.9 7 Furthermore, federal courts
rendering decisions after Rhodes require that a prison official act recklessly
or deliberately indifferent, rather than merely negligent toward a pervasive risk
of harm to constitute an eighth amendment violation. 98 For example, in the
District of Columbia Court case of Murphy v. United States,99 a group of
Lorton Youth Center inmates attacked, beat and stabbed the plaintiff, a
nineteen year old inmate, causing the plaintiff to suffer permanent partial
paralysis.'0° The plaintiff brought suit under the eighth amendment and
provided statistics of violence at the Youth Center in an effort to demonstrate
a pervasive risk of harm.' 0 The Murphy court found that the assault statistics
did not amount to a risk of harm sufficient to alert officials of a need to
take special protection measures.'0 2 -Consequently, the Murphy court held
95. Seesupra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussion of differing nature of Rhodes
and Shrader facts).
96. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (Shrader court's affirmation of district
court's adaptation of Rhodes' unnecessary and wanton behavior requirement).
97. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-49; see also supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (Rhodes
opinion modified earlier Fourth Circuit decision in Woodhous v. Virginia which held that a
showing of a prison officials' negligence is sufficient to establish an eighth amendment claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
98. See, e.g., Thomas v. Booker, 762 F.2d 654, 658-59 (8th Cir. 1985) (proof of reckless
disregard of prisoner's right to safety necessary to establish eighth amendment claim); Davidson
v. O'Lone, 752 F.2d 817, 828 (3d Cir. 1984) (must demonstrate prison officials' intentional,
deliberate or reckless indifference toward prisoners' safety to prove violation of eighth amend-
ment); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984) (must show reckless indifference to
prisoners' right to safety or tacit authorization of practices that deprive prisoner of safety to
validate eighth amendment claim), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1413 (1985); Walsh v. Brewer, 733
F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1984) (must show deliberate indifference to pervasive risk of harm); Stewart
v. Love, 696 F.2d 43, 43-44 (6th Cir. 1982) (must show more than mere negligence of prison
official to sustain eighth amendment claim); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d at 1253 (must prove
deliberate indifference of prison official to establish an eighth amendment claim); Murphy v.
United States, 653 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (must show deliberate indifference to pervasive
risk of harm to satisfy claim of eighth amendment violation).
99. 653 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 639.
101. See id. at 645. In Murphy, the plaintiff provided evidence that, during the 1976
calendar year, 20 assaults occurred at the Lorton Youth Center, which housed 344 inmates.
Six of the 20 assaults occurred in Dormitory #3, which housed 100 inmates. Id.
102. Id.; see also Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142, 1149 (7th Cir. 1984) (frequent occurrences
of assault that cause a prisoner to reasonably fear for safety and cause prison officials' to be
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that the plaintiff could not succeed with an eighth amendment claim because
the plaintiff failed to demonstrate prison officials' deliberate indifference
towards a pervasive risk of harm.'13 The Shrader court's reckless and wanton
behavior requirement, therefore, is consistent with both the Supreme Court's
opinion in Rhodes and with the opinions of other federal courts that have
considered prison officials' responsibility for violence within prisons.,"'
Finally, the Shrader court, relying on Rhodes, affirmed the district
court's order holding that unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain also
must be devoid of any penological justification. 05 Actually, the district
court's order misinterpreted the Rhodes opinion's statement that pain without
penological justification is an example of unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted
pain.' 6 The Rhodes opinion does not mandate that pain inflicted from a
prison condition must be penologically unjustified to establish an eighth
amendment violation. 07 Furthermore, no lower federal courts suggest that a
finding of penologically unjustified pain is indispensable to an eighth amend-
ment claim.0 8 The Shrader court's misunderstanding of the Rhodes opinion's
statement concerning penologically unjustified pain, however, did not affect
the court's decision since the court had no need to consider the penological
justification issue.' 9 With the exception of the penological justification issue,
the Fourth Circuit in Shrader properly interpreted the Rhodes eighth amend-
ment standard." 0
Although Shrader and Rhodes each examined a specific condition of con-
finement, each court used a different analysis to examine the factors which
constituted the condition of confinement."' The analysis applied in Rhodes
aware of need for protection may constitute a pervasive risk of harm); Walsh v. Brewer, 733
F.2d 473-476 (7th Cir. 1984) (frequency of assaults may demonstrate pervasive risk of harm).
103. See Murphy, 653 F.2d at 645 (courts hold level of violence at Lorton Youth Center
not high enough to require prison officials' awareness of need for protective measures).
104. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (demonstrating validity of Shrader
court's affirmation of magistrate's application of unnecessary and wanton behavior standard).
105. Shrader, 761 F.2d at 979; see supra note 22 (definition of penological).
106. Compare Shrader, 761 F.2d at 979 (pain must be without penological justification to
establish eighth amendment claims) with Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (noting that one example of
unnecessary and wanton pain is pain inflicted without any penological justification) (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 183, 153 (1976)).
107. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346.
108. See Smith v. Coughlin, 748 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding unconstitutional
punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, unnecessarily and wantonly
inflicted, or totally without penological justification); Martin v. White, 742 F.2d 469, 474 (8th
Cir. 1984) (example of unnecessary and wanton pain is pain inflicted without penological
justification).
109. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 979-80. The Shrader court affirmed the district court's
finding that the VSP inmates did not experience pain from fear of violence. Id. Consequently,
the Shrader court never reached the issue whether penological justification existed for the pain
inflicted upon prisoners. Id.
110. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text (explaining validity of Shrader court's
interpretation of Rhodes conditions of confinement standard).
11. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text (distinguishing Shrader court's analysis
from Rhodes analysis).
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undertook an examination of the cumulative effect of all the factors involved
in double celling at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility." 2 In contrast
to the Rhodes analysis, the Shrader court's specific factor analysis involved
a review of the constitutionality of each specific factor that contributed to
the threat of inmate safety at the VSP.II The Shrader court's remand of the
weapons issue to the district court, without the simultaneous remand of other
factors that also contributed to the lack of inmate safety, demonstrates the
Shrader court's specific factor analysis. I' The Shrader court's specific factor
analysis fails to recognize the interdependence of different factors involved
in a condition of confinement and, therefore, fails to examine the factors'
cumulative effect." 5 The Shrader court's specific factor analysis, therefore,
establishes artificial divisions between factors which together create a unique
condition of confinement."I " Consequently, the Shrader court's specific fac-
tor analysis is not only inconsistent with the Supreme Court's specific factor
analysis in Rhodes,"7 but the specific factor analysis also fails to recognize
that an eighth amendment inquiry should focus on the entire effect of punish-
ment upon prisoners."'
With the exception of Shrader, the federal courts agree that the consti-
tutionality of a particular condition of confinement depends upon the
cumulative effect of several factors." 9 The federal courts, however, are
divided concerning whether a totality of otherwise individually constitutional
prison conditions may become unconstitutional through aggregation. 20 Courts
that apply the totality of conditions analysis examine the cumulative impact
of different prison conditions of confinement to determine whether the
112. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (Rhodes analysis).
113. Compare notes 5-6 and accompanying text (Rhodes analysis) with notes 55-75 and
accompanying text (Shrader analysis.
114. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (Shrader court remands weapons issue
to district court without evidence of frequent attacks, drug activity or inadequate security
factors which inay exacerbate dangerousness of weapons).
115. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (demonstrating narrowness of Shrader
court's specific factor review of inmate safety issue).
116. See id.; also Shrader, 761 F.2d at 980 (VSP inmates complain that several factors,
in combination, amount to threat to inmate safety); infra notes 155-62 and accompanying text
(arguing artificiality of analyses which do not examine cumulative effects of different circum-
stances).
117. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussion of inconsistencies between
Rhodes and Shrader analyses).
118. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text (demonstrating need to examine entire
effect of imprisoned).
119. See infra notes 124 & 129 and accompanying text (examining Jones v. Diamond and
Hoptowit v. Ray as models of federal courts' agreement that particular prison conditions are
aggregations of several factors).
120. See infra notes 121-35 and accompanying text (demonstrating division between federal
courts on totality issue). Compare Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981)
(courts may not find eighth amendment violation based upon totality of conditions) with Doe
v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (totality of conditions of confinement
may violate eighth amendment).
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conditions' overall effect amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.' 2' For
example, in Jones v. Diamond,'22 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit employed a totality of conditions analysis to determine
whether prison conditions at the Jackson County Jail (JCJ) in Mississippi
violated the eighth amendment. 23 First, the Jones court examined the cu-
mulative impact of factors that contributed to each challenged condition of
confinement. 24 The Jones court then determined that the totality of the
challenged conditions of confinement namely the threat to inmate safety,
overcrowding, inadequate food, lack of exercise, and lack of santitation at
the JCJ-amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment.
25
Alternatively, federal courts that reject the totality of conditions analysis
interpret the Rhodes opinion to require that a specific condition of confine-
ment must individually amount to an eighth amendment violation before a
court will declare the condition unconstitutional. 26 For example, in Hoptowit
v. Ray, 2 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied
the individual condition analysis to determine whether prison conditions at
the Washington State Penitentiary (WSP) constituted a violation of the
eighth amendment.' 28 The Hoptowit court first determined the cumulative
effect of several different factors involved in the threat to inmate safety at
the WSP. 29 The first part of the Hoptowit analysis, therefore, is identical
121. See infra notes 122-124 and accompanying text (examining Jones court's application
of the totality of conditions analysis).
122. 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom., Ledbetter v. Jones, 453 U.S. 950
(1981).
123. See supra notes 121 & 122 (Jones court's application of totality analysis).
124. See Jones, 636 F.2d at 1373. One of the challenged conditions of confinement in
Jones was the threat to inmate safety. Id. The Jones court recognized that different factors such
as prisoner abuse from other prisoners, inaccess to prisoners of jail security personnel, inmate-
controlled prison management, continuous violence, and a prisoner-run kangaroo court amounted
to a condition of confinement that posed a threat to inmate safety. Id.
125. Id. at 1374.
126. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1492-93 (9th Cir. 1984) (examining
each challenged condition of confinement individually rather than employing totality analysis);
Wellman v. Faulkner, 715 F.2d 269, 275 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that otherwise constitutional
conditions may not become unconstitutional through aggregation), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3587
(1984); Smith v. Fairman, 690 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that vague conclusion that
totality of conditions amounts to eighth amendment violation not sufficient to establish cruel
and unusual punishment); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (specific
condition must amount to eighth amendment violation); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132
(9th Cir. 1981) (same); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 595 F. Supp. 1558, 1563 (D.
Idaho 1984) (holding that threat to inmate safety constituted specific condition of confinement
in violation of eighth amendment).
127. 642 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1981).
128. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47 (under individual condition analysis, several
otherwise constitutional conditions may not, in combination, amount to eighth amendment
violation).
129. See id. at 1249-50 (examining cumulative effects of factors contributing to threat to
inmate safety). The Hoptowit court acknowledged that overcrowding, idleness, a deteriorating
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to the first part of the Jones analysis. 30 The second step in the Hoptowit
individual condition analysis, however, distinguishes the Hoptowit court's
analysis from the Jones court's analysis.' 3' In contrast to the Jones court's
examination of the constitutionality of the totality of the challenged condi-
tions of confinement, 3 2 the Hoptowit court examined the constitutionality
of each particular condition of confinement. 3 Under the individual condition
analysis, the Hoptowit court found that the condition of the threat to inmate
safety constituted a violation of the eighth amendment. 3 4 Unlike the Jones
court, however, the Hoptowit court held that otherwise constitutional prison
conditions could not, in combination, amount to an eighth amendment
violation. ta1
The Shrader court applied the Hoptowit court's individual condition
analysis to the VSP inmates' complaints that lack of fire protection, inade-
quate physical prison facilities, and unsanitary food at the VSP constituted
cruel and unusual conditions of confinement. 36 The Shrader court, however,
applied an unprecedented specific factor analysis to the VSP prisoners'
complaint that the threat of danger to prison inmates constituted a cruel and
unusual condition of confinement.' 37 The specific factor analysis examines
physical plant, lack of medical care and other factors cumulatively had a negative effect upon
WSP prisoners which, in turn, caused high levels of violence. Id. The Hoptowit court found
that the high levels of violence constituted a violation of the eighth amendment. Id. at 1250.
130. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (explanation of first step involved in
application of Jones totality of conditions analysis); supra note 129 and accompanying text
(explanation of first step involved in application of Hoptowit individual condition analysis).
Both the Jones totality of conditions analysis and the Hoptowit individual condition analysis
begin with an examination of the cumulative effect of factors contributing to a particular prison
condition. Jones, 636 F.2d at 1373; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1249-50.
131. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text (discussion of difference between Jones
and Hoptowit courts' analyses).
132. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (demonstration of Jones totality of
conditions analysis).
133. See Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1247 (discussion of use of individual condition analysis in
addressing challenges to conditions of confinement). The Hoptowit court held that a court must
show that a specific condition violates the eighth amendment in order to hold that specific
condition unconstitutional. Id. Furthermore, the Hoptowit court found erroneous the district
court's attempt to remedy a condition of confinement that merely contributed to the unconsti-
tutionality of another condition of confinement. Id. at 1255-56. The Hoptowit court held the
specific condition itself must amount to an eighth amendment violation in order for a court to
address or remedy the condition. Id.
134. See id. 642 F.2d at 1249-50 (court considered all factors contributing to threat to inmate
safety).
135. Id. at 1246-47.
136. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (Shrader court examined each condition of
confinement including fire hazards, food inadequacy, prison plant inadequacy and inmate safety
individually).
137. Compare Shrader, 761 F.2d at 980-83 (considering each factor involved in the threat
to inmate safety individually in order to determine whether specific factor amounted to
eighth amendment violation) with Hoptowit, 642 F.2d at 1249-50 (application of individual
condition analysis considers cumulative effect of different factors contributing to prison
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the constitutionality of each factor of a prison condition in an isolated
fashion. 3' In contrast to both the individual condition and totality of
conditions analyses, the specific factor analysis fails to consider the cumu-
lative impact of different factors which constitute a particular prison condi-
tion. 39 The Shrader court's specific factor analysis thus rejects the individual
condition and totality of conditions analyses' premises that a condition of
confinement is actually an aggrcgation of several factors.14
In contrast, the Shrader dissent argued that the individual condition
analysis applied not only to the food adequacy, physical plant and fire
hazard prison conditions, but also to the condition of the threat to inmate
safety.' 41 The Shrader dissent explained that, as different factors interact
with one another, the combination of factors creates a condition of confine-
ment. 42 The Shrader dissent argued that courts considering eighth amend-
ment challenges to prison conditions should examine the constitutionality of
an aggregation of factors constituting a condition of confinement rather than
the constitutionality of each factor contributing to the challenged prison
condition. 4 The Shrader dissent, however, did not consider the possibility
that conditions of confinement which do not individually constitute eighth
amendment violations may, in combination, constitute an eighth amendment
violation.' 44
Although the Shrader court did not consider the possibility that condi-
tions of confinement, in combination, could constitute an eighth amendment
violation, application of the totality of conditions analysis results in a more
just adjudication of prisoners' challenges to conditions of confinement. 45
Courts that apply the totality of conditions analysis recognize that prison
conditions exert a cumulative impact upon the imprisoned. 46 Since the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment focuses upon
condition of threat to inmate safety); Jones, 636 F.2d at 1373 (court's application of totality of
conditions analysis recognizes cumulative effect of different factors upon particular prison
condition).
138. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (explaining specific factor analysis).
139. See supra notes 119-138 and accompanying text (discussing specific factor analysis
and other analyses used to examine factors involved with prison conditions).
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 77-79 (Shrader dissent's argument that Shrader majority erred in
separating factors involved in threat to inmate safety).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 988 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting). The Shrader
dissent suggested that the threat to inmate safety at the VSP constituted an unconstitutional
prison condition. Id. The Shrader dissent also concurred with the majority's decision that the
prison conditions of fire hazards, food inadequacy and prison facilities are each, individually,
adequate constitutionally. Id. at 987-88. The Shrader dissent, therefore, supported the individual
condition analysis. Id.
145. See infra notes 146-76 and accompanying text (supporting totality of conditions test).
146. See Doe v. District of Columbia, 701 F.2d 948, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (conditions of
confinement exist in combination and produce certain effects which each condition alone is
incapable of producing).
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the prisoner's experience, courts must evaluate the constitutionality of prison
conditions as the prisoner experiences the conditions rather than in an isolated
fashion. 47 For example, the Supreme Court in Rhodes held that double
ceiling, as the practice existed at the Southern Ohio Correctional facility
(SOCF), 11 did not constitute an eighth amendment violation.', 9 The Rhodes
decision, however, did not foreclose the possibility that the same type of dou-
ble celling found at the SOCF, combined with other detrimental conditions
of confinement not then present at SOCF, might violate the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.'5I The Rhodes opi-
nion therefore suggests that a particular condition of confinement, constitu-
tional when considered alone, may contribute to cruel and unusual conditions
of confinement when combined with other undesirable prison conditions.'"
Application of the totality of conditions analysis also enables the judi-
ciary to protect prisoners' rights to be free from cruel and unusual conditions
of confinement.1 52 A prisoner's primary source of redress for deprivations
of an eighth amendment right is the federal judiciary,'53 whose function
encompasses the determination and redress of constitutional violations.5 4 A
court employing a totality of conditions analysis may address and remedy
prison conditions that contribute to cruel and unusual confinement within a
prison.1 5 In comparison, courts that employ the individual condition ap-
147. See id. (holding that courts should consider prison conditions as a whole in order to
correctly assess the impact upon the imprisoned); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D.
Ark. 1970) (suggesting cumulative impact upon prisoners of prison conditions in combination)
aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
148. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 (taking account of specific circumstances under which
double-ceiling existed at SOCF).
149. Id. at 348-50.
150. See id. at 348. The Rhodes opinion suggested that double celling, combined with
inadequate sanitation, food or medical care, might amount to an eighth amendment violation.
Id.
151. Id. at 347 (holding that conditions, alone or in combination, may amount to an eighth
amendment violation). But see Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246-47 (7th Cir. 1982)
(suggesting courts should not literally interpret Rhodes language).
152. See infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text (demonstrating superiority of totality
of conditions analysis for effective examination of cruel and unusual conditions of confinement).
153. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 358-60 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting public apathy to
plight of prisoners and political powerlessness of prisoners themselves). Justice Brennan, in
Rhodes, acknowledged that the judiciary is the driving force behind correction of prison
deficiencies which violate the eighth amendment. Id.; see also Doe v. District of Columbia, 701
F.2d 948, 960 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (separate statement by J. Edwards) (prisoners are vulnerable
and defenseless); Swygert, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 16 VA. U. L. Rv. 439, 453-56
(1982) (judicial activism necessary for protection of prisoners' rights).
154. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978) (judiciary's function is to remedy
constitutional violations); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145 (5th Cir. 1982) (courts may
require only those remedies necessary to correct a constitutional violation), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1042 (1983).
155. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1153 (1982) (court may order remedies for
conditions that taken together, violate the eighth amendment), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983);
Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981) (using totality of conditions analysis,
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proach address and remedy only conditions of confinement that independ-
ently amount to a constitutional violation. 56 Use of the individual condition
analysis, therefore, presents the possibility that individually constitutional
prison conditions which together amount to cruel and unusual punishment
will remain unremedied.'5 7 The failure to afford remedies may result in
injustice to the prison population through exposure to unconstitutional prison
conditions. 5 8 The individual condition analysis also presents the possibility
that, after a determination that a particular prison condition is unconstitu-
tional, prison administrators will direct resources to remedy the unconstitu-
tional condition and neglect a highly related but individually constitutional
prison condition. 5 9 Remedying one cruel and unusual condition of confine-
ment without remedying a related but individually constitutional prison
condition could result in a misallocation of judicial resources should a new
suit be brought challenging the related condition of confinement.16' Judicial
resources are more efficiently allocated through a totality of conditions
analysis which addresses all the factors that contribute to cruel and unusual
conditions of confinement at one trial.' 6' The application of the totality of
conditions analysis, therefore, is important to a federal court's efficiency
and ability to protect prisoners' right to be free from cruel and unusual
prison conditions.'
62
The Supreme Court in Rhodes suggested that federal courts should
exercise judicial restraint and deference to prison administrators and state
legislatures in the determination of how America's state and federal prisons
should operate.16 The Rhodes decision's theory of judicial restraint centers
on the assumption that prison administrators and state legislatures are not
court orders injunction to correct abuses that contribute to overall unconstitutionality of prisons'
conditions of confinement).
156. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1263 (7th Cir. 1982). The Hoptowit court used
the independent condition analysis to reverse the district court's order to the prison to improve
a classification system because the inadequacy of the classification system only contributed to
an eighth amendment violation, and did not independently amount to an eighth amendment
violation. Id.
157. See id. (court reinstates prison condition that contributed to an unconstitutional prison
condition but did not amount to an unconsitutional prison condition).
158. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322-23 (D.N.H. 1977) (presenting idea
that otherwise constitutional prison conditions may, in aggregate, amount to cruel and unusual
punishment). Under Laaman, if several prison conditions constitute an eighth amendment
violation, the remedying of one unconstitutional condition may not resolve the violation. Id.
159. See Note, Challenging Cruel and Unusual Conditions of Prison Confinement: Refining
the Totality of the Conditions Approach, 26 How. L.J. 227, 247 (1983) (discussing inequities
of independent condition analysis).
160. Id. at 249-50 (examining continuing litigation over conditions of confinement in
Maryland prison after district court applied individual condition analysis and remedy).
161. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (court applying totality test may address
all conditions that contribute to an eighth amendment violation).
162. See id. (demonstrating federal courts' increased ability to redress eighth amendment
violations through application of the totality analysis).
163. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352 (suggesting need for judicial restraint concerning prison
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insensitive to the constitutional limitations and social aims of the American
criminal justice system.' 4 According to Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in Rhodes, however, state legislatures and prison administrators often are
insensitive to constitutional requirements forbidding cruel and unusual prison
conditions. ,
65
In addition to the doctrine's unsound assumption, the judicial doctrine
of deference to prison administrators and state legislatures does not outweigh
the constitutional mandate that federal courts must consider prisoners' claims
of constitutional violations as well as provide guidance for remedying such
violations.'6 For example, in Martin v. White,' 67 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressed extreme dissatisfaction with prison
authorities' callous failure to provide prisoners at the Missouri Training
Center with protection from violence from other inmates. 68 The prison
administrator in White had failed to establish adequate patrol procedures
and had failed to establish a classification scheme that would aid in deter-
mining compatibility between prisoners. 69 In addition, the prison adminis-
trator in White had failed to conduct examinations of cell locks and had
failed to report incidents of inmate upon inmate attacks to the prosecutor
conditions of confinement claims); see also infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing
basis for Rhodes' judicial restraint policy).
164. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352; See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981) (courts
must remember that judicial function is to enforce constitutional requirements and not to deter-
mine best manner in which to operate a penal institution) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 539 (1979)); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974) (solutions to deplorable
prison conditions require expert knowledge, comprehensive planning and resource commitment,
all of which are within realm of legislative and executive government responsibilities and powers).
165. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 353, 361 (Brennan, J., concurring). Listing decisions in
twenty-four states which held that prison conditions violated the eighth amendment, Justice
Brennan wrote a separate opinion to emphasize the indispensability of judicial activism in
addressing eighth amendment claims. Id.; Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 376 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citing cases from twenty-four states to support theory that state governments and prison
administrators are insensitive to eighth amendment requirements).
166. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974) (courts have primary responsibility
to address constitutional violations); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 269 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (policies concerning judicial restraint cannot prevent court from performing its
duty to address valid constitutional claims). In addition to the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, prisoners retain other constitutional guarantees during incarceration, see,
e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 837 (1974) (prisoners entitled to first amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (prisoners
entitled to fourteenth amendment's due process right of security against deprivation of life,
property or additional liberty); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (prisoners guaranteed
first amendment right to freedom of speech); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (fourteenth
amendment equal protection clause protects prisoners from discrimination on basis of race).
167. 742 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1984).
168. Id. at 473; see infra text accompanying notes 169-70 (explaining prison administrators'
reckless disregard of danger to inmates).
169. While, 742 F.2d at 475.
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as required by law. 70 The White court noted that the prison administrator's
failure to employ preventive policies actually may have encouraged inmate
violence.' 7 ' The White court suggested that courts faced with facts similar to
those presented in White should not hesitate to make findings of cruel and
unusual conditions of confinement. 72 The White opinion demonstrates that
the federal judiciary's primary function is to consider and remedy valid
claims of constitutional violations.
73
Federal courts need not fear that the totality of conditions analysis will
erode the function of the state legislatures and prison administrators in
effecting prison reform.1 4 The totality of conditions analysis requires that
the judiciary determine whether conditions of confinement are unconstitu-
tional, but the judiciary then may defer to the state legislature and prison
administration for the fashioning of remedies. 75 Moreover, federal circuit
courts have often limited zealous reforms undertaken through the district
courts' applications of the totality of conditions analysis.
7 6
The Fourth Circuit in Shrader v. White, applying the individual condition
analysis, erred in failing to consider the cumulative effect of different factors
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 473. In Martin v. White, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized
that judicial attention to prison conditions is indispensable to the enforcement of prisoners'
constitutional rights. Id.
173. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussing idea that primary function of
federal judiciary is to ensure compliance with the requirements of constitution).
174. See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (demonstrating courts' deference to
legislature on remedy determinations and circuit courts' effectiveness at halting overbroad
reforms district courts have undertaken).
175. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979) (after determining whether eighth
amendment violations exist, court should defer remedy determinations to prison officials unless
such deference would jeopardize goals of eighth amendment); Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d
1364, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981) (role of federal courts is to enforce constitutional requirements of
eighth amendment without overseeing jail administration); Dawson v. Kendrick, 457 F. Supp.
1252, 1282 (S.D. W.Va. 1981) (courts must not articulate remedies that are not constitutionally
compelled). But cf. Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145 (5th Cir. 1982) (portions of district
court's reparative injunction that did not exceed limits of judicial authority were left intact for
purpose of correcting constitutional violations); Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 257, 279
(E.D. Ark. 1976) (issuing several directives to prison administrators after repeated failure of prison
officials to bring prison conditions within constitutionally tolerable limits) aff'd., Finney V. Hut-
to, 548 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977) aff'd., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) reh'g denied, Hutto
v. Finney, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
176. See Godinez v. Lane, 733 F.2d 1250, 1262 (7th Cir. 1984) (non constitutionally
compelled judicial remedies reversed on appeal); Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713
F.2d 984, 1002 (3d Cir. 1983) (overly intrusive remedy reversed on appeal in favor of less
intrusive remedy), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 567 (loth
Cir. 1980) (district court's intrusive remedial orders vacated on remand), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1041 (1981).
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involved in the threat to inmate safety prison condition. 77 The Shrader court
thus created a specific factor analysis which the court used to examine each
factor of the condition of the threat to inmate safety in isolation. 7 1 Under
the specific factor analysis, the Shrader court generally upheld the district
court's conclusion that each factor involved in the threat to inmate safety at
the VSP met the Rhodes eighth amendment standard of constitutionality.
7 9
In contrast, the Shrader dissent suggested that a correct application of the
individual condition analysis, which would have examined the cumulative
effect of the factors involved in the threat to inmate safety, would have
warranted a reversal of the district court magistrate's holding.
80
Although the Shrader dissent's individual condition analysis is a legiti-
mate test to use in examining prisoners' challenges to prison condition of
confinement,' the totality of conditions analysis ensures a more just adju-
dication of prisoners' claims. 82 The totality of conditions analysis not only
provides insight to the prisoners' entire imprisonment experience8 3 but, also
promotes judicial effectiveness, judicial economy and the proper function of
the judiciary. 84 The Fourth Circuit, after Shrader, should apply the totality
of conditions analysis to prisoners' conditions of confinement challenges to
realistically evaluate the constitutionality of prison conditions and to promote
the effective function of the American judiciary.
8 5
CHARLENE WENDY CHRISTOFILES
177. See supra notes 124 & 129 and accompanying text (demonstrating recognition among
federal courts that prison condition is merely aggregation of different factors).
178. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text (Shrader court's application of specific
factor analysis to threat to inmate safety prison condition).
179. See id. But see id. at 982-83 (Shrader court disagreed with magistrate's reasoning that
eighth amendment does not protect prisoners from existence of weapons).
180. See Shrader, 761 F.2d at 988 (Sprouse, J., concurring and dissenting). The Shrader
dissent argued that the VSP inmates proved that the threat to inmate safety at the VSP
constituted eighth amendment violation. Id.
181. See supra note 8 (listing courts apply individual condition analysis).
182. See supra notes 145-62 and accompanying text (arguing inherent fairness in application
of totality analysis).
183. See supra notes 146-47 (explanation and demonstration of totality of conditions
analysis' examination of prisoners' entire experiences).
184. See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text (explaining judicial aims furthered
through application of totality analysis).
185. See supra notes 145-76 and accompanying text (arguing in favor of totality analysis).
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